Russia has been consistently pushing a narrative for several months that NATO is preparing to attack Russia first - to blockade ports, strike military bases, and carry out sabotage against Russian underwater infrastructure.
Initially, this claim appeared mainly in propaganda materials. On June 8, RIA reported on the BALTOPS exercises in an almost openly conspiratorial manner, claiming that around 20 NATO ships were allegedly “preparing to strike Russia and carry out sabotage against underwater infrastructure.” No evidence was provided, of course.
A week later, virtually the same narrative was voiced by Patrushev, Putin’s aide and chairman of the Maritime Board. He said that “the West is preparing not simply for a blockade” and that, according to Moscow, scenarios “up to and including preemptive strikes against our bases” were being considered. Moreover, Patrushev claimed that merchant ships carrying magnetic mines attached to their hulls were already “regularly” entering Russian ports, and suggested that the mines were being installed in European ports. Again, he provided no evidence for this claim.
But the most interesting part is what Patrushev proposes doing in response. He is no longer talking simply about defending Russia’s coastline. According to him, the Russian Navy must act “actively and assertively,” seize the initiative, and impose its will on the adversary near its own shores: “There is no need to wait until NATO ships, aircraft, or drones appear near our maritime borders… On the contrary, we should be the ones appearing right under the likely adversary’s nose.”
This is a classic Russian pattern of preemptive justification: Moscow invents the claim that NATO is allegedly preparing an attack → waiting for the attack is dangerous → Russia must seize the initiative → Russia’s first move is presented not as an attack, but as “preemptive defense.”
This is precisely how the Kremlin explains its invasion of Ukraine. To reinforce this narrative, Russia uses real statements from Western officials and gives them the “right” interpretation.
A recent example is Kaliningrad. On August 27, former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Antanas Valionis said that in the event of a direct conflict between Russia and NATO, the military capabilities of the Kaliningrad region would be destroyed preemptively. The Russian headline already sounded different: “Lithuania threatens preemptive NATO strikes on the Kaliningrad region.” Russian Telegram channels went further: “Lithuania is preparing a preemptive strike on Kaliningrad.”
The same thing is happening with underwater cables. The real problem exists: NATO is protecting critical underwater infrastructure, monitoring Russia’s undersea capabilities, and preparing for possible acts of sabotage. The Russian version reverses the causality: if NATO is preparing to protect cables and has underwater units, then NATO itself must be preparing to cut Russian cables.
At the same time, Russia is pushing two seemingly contradictory narratives. When European cables are damaged, Moscow says: you cannot prove that Russia did it. But at the same time, the Russian information space constantly reminds audiences that Russia is capable of destroying these cables.
The two claims coexist perfectly: “We are not doing this.” and “But if we wanted to, we could.” The first creates plausible deniability. The second serves as a threat.
That is why the current information campaign should be taken more seriously than ordinary conspiracy theories. It may be a way of changing the starting point for a future conflict in advance.
Imagine that tomorrow a cable is damaged, a port is attacked, a ship is mined, or a serious incident involving a NATO vessel occurs. The question of “who started it?” becomes critical. But Russia’s answer will already be prepared: the West started it. We warned about preparations for sabotage. We knew about plans for a blockade. We knew about preemptive strikes. What Russia did was merely a response.
