Election distrust grows when citizens cannot verify the process. Blockchain cannot make elections trustworthy, but can make parts publicly verifiable.
This article examines blockchain’s role across identity, voting, recording, tallying, and verification, using cases from Russia, Switzerland, and Estonia.
Key Takeaways
-Blockchain can strengthen tally integrity, but cannot prevent incorrect inputs. The oracle problem remains.
-Blockchain does not guarantee E2E-V. Switzerland achieved it without blockchain, using ZKPs, verifiable mixnets, open-source code, and audits.
-Russia used blockchain but lacked independent verification. Estonia spent 18 years building digital identity, open software, audits, and re-voting.
-Korea should aim for “verifiable elections,” not “blockchain elections,” through open-source code, audits, post-election checks, digital identity, and dispute procedures.
작성자
- Shim Taekbeom(@0xmuang)
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