The problem with this argument is that it imports a political logic that does not really apply to the Islamic Republic. The question should not be whether an official is “more loyal” or “less loyal” to the Leader. State officials are expected to be committed to the values of the Islamic Revolution and to the leadership, while their suitability for a particular position should be assessed on the basis of experience, competence, judgment and the demands of the circumstances.
Imam Mojtaba Khamenei’s decision to appoint Mohsen Rezaei should therefore be understood in that context. Rezaei brings decades of experience in security, defence and state affairs, as well as a long record of commitment to the revolutionary cause. His straightforward and serious approach has also made him a target of criticism from reformists and other political camps precisely because he does not generally soften his positions to accommodate political perceptions.
In a war, serious positions require serious and direct figures. The SNSC Secretary is not appointed to satisfy the public’s preferred image of what a secretary should sound like. Nor should an important state position be weakened, delayed or compromised merely because some statements might affect public perception.
There is also a broader problem here. Public perception is not a stable measure of state policy. The same public that demands one position today may demand something completely different tomorrow. If major state decisions are constantly adjusted simply to satisfy immediate public expectations, governance becomes reactive rather than strategic.
The more important issue is the growing tendency across different levels of the state to treat governance as a theatre of messaging, signalling and perception management rather than as the execution of policy. When every institution becomes preoccupied with “giving a message” instead of doing the work, the practical machinery of governance is inevitably weakened.
If Rezaei speaks more directly than his predecessors, that does not automatically diminish the SNSC. What matters is whether his words correspond to the state’s strategic position and whether the institution is capable of turning those positions into action. In wartime, clarity and seriousness can be far more valuable than carefully managed silence.
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