🚨 CVE-2026-86219
Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.
server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.
An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.
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IETF Datatracker
RFC 2831: Using Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism
This specification defines how HTTP Digest Authentication can be used as a SASL mechanism for any protocol that has a SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer) profile. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
September 6, 2026 66
