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BitOK: post #503 — TG.ME

BitOK@bitok_global · 274 subscribers Open in TelegramOpen

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August 14, 2026 64 1

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[media post] 23·Sep 2

📈 Pump a Token by Hundreds of Times, Drain the Liquidity: Inside the Tectonic Attack On August 30, an attacker targeted Tectonic, a lending protocol on Cronos. The key was manipulating the price of the illiquid TONIC token, pushing it up by hundreds of times and using the inflated value to borrow liquid assets. 🟩 The attack unfolded in several steps: ➤ 5M USDC was deposited into the position; ➤ borrowed USDC and CRO were used to buy TONIC across three VVS pools; ➤ TONIC’s price increased by roughly 454× against USDC, 599× against WCRO, and 668× against VVS; ➤ TONIC was repeatedly borrowed and supplied back into Tectonic, allowing liquid assets to be withdrawn from the protocol. 🔍 Some of the funds left Cronos before the network stopped After the attack, the assets were distributed across several addresses. BitOK analysts traced 6.34M USDC from Cronos to Ethereum, where the entire amount was swapped for ETH. At the time of our check, the main Ethereum address still held 2,592 ETH. Expanding the cluster revealed earlier links. One address in the funding chain had received funds from Tornado Cash. Another connected branch moved 4,532 USDC through Arbitrum to Hyperliquid, where it was used to buy XMR1. No withdrawal of native XMR to the Monero network was confirmed. Less than two hours after the position was created, Cronos stopped producing new blocks. Assets still on Cronos therefore can’t move while the network remains halted. That doesn’t mean the funds were seized or permanently frozen. ❤️ Funds can move across chains, services, and wallets. Check their history and risk before you transact with BitOK Bot. Website | Telegram | BitOK bot 47·Sep 1

🇲🇽 BitOK is heading to SiGMA North America in Mexico City From September 1–3, the BitOK team will be at SiGMA North America, the event’s first edition in Mexico, bringing together the North American and Latin American markets. iGaming operators, payment providers, fintech companies, technology providers, and regulators will all meet in one place. For us, it’s a chance to discuss how the industry is approaching crypto payments and the risks that come with them across the region. 💵 Crypto payments require more than KYC Exposure to sanctioned addresses, scams, stolen funds, and other high-risk sources exists at the on-chain transaction level. In Mexico City, we’ll be talking about how AML/KYT helps iGaming businesses identify these connections before a transaction and build stronger controls around crypto risk. ❤️ Going to SiGMA North America? Message us and let’s meet to talk AML, KYT, and the crypto risks businesses are dealing with today. Website | Telegram | BitOK bot 41·Aug 31

✔️ Pump the Price, Take $8.7M: Breaking Down the Moonwell Attack On August 27, $8.7M in assets was drained from Moonwell. The key to the attack wasn’t a bug in the code. It was the price of the collateral. The attacker pushed up the price of the illiquid MAMO token through a series of large buys, deposited it into Moonwell at an inflated valuation, and borrowed liquid assets against it. ⚙️ The attack started six days before the funds moved BitOK analysts reconstructed the preparation behind the attack. A linked address received 800 ETH from Tornado Cash, moved part of the funds across Ethereum, Cronos, and Arbitrum, and then prepared the capital for the attack on Base. On Base, funds and MAMO were sent to a separate address. Then the attack unfolded: ➤ large buys pushed up the price of MAMO; ➤ at least 35.5M MAMO was deposited into Moonwell as collateral; ➤ against the inflated collateral, the attacker borrowed 71.36 cbBTC, 2.56M USDC, 560 WETH, and 368 wstETH. 🔍 From Moonwell back to Ethereum: where did the $8.7M end up? After the withdrawal, the assets were converted to USDC and moved from Base to Ethereum via Circle CCTP. There, 8.728M USDC was swapped for DAI and sent back to the address where the attack preparation had started. After all the swaps and cross-chain transfers, the funds returned to the original address as $8.7M in DAI. At the time of our analysis, the funds were still sitting in that wallet with no confirmed onward movement. ❤️ Funds can change chains, assets, and wallets, but their history remains part of the risk picture. Check addresses and transaction history before you transact with BitOK Bot. Website | Telegram | BitOK bot 44·Aug 28

🧠 When Governance Gets Exploited: Where Term Finance’s $8.5M Went The attacker didn’t need to find a smart contract vulnerability to drain millions from Term Finance. A small stake in the vault was enough to propose the changes they needed and wait for no one to say “no.” The weak point wasn’t the code. It was the protocol’s governance. ⚙️ Six days to stop the withdrawal The attacker swapped 0.5 ETH for a stake in the ETH Meta Vault, received governance tokens, and submitted a proposal containing 17 actions. Those actions included removing the protective delay, pulling WETH back from four strategies, and adding an attacker-controlled exit strategy. The proposal remained open for around six days. No one vetoed it. Once the window closed, the protocol executed the actions and transferred 2,841.74 WETH to the attacker. A similar setup targeted five USDC vaults. Separate proposals changed key roles and risk controls, allowing another 1.68M USDC to be withdrawn. 🔍 Where did the funds go? BitOK analysts traced the full flow: ➤ WETH was converted to ETH; ➤ USDC was swapped for DAI via KyberSwap and Maker PSM; ➤ the ETH and DAI were consolidated into a single wallet. The attacker didn’t need to break the code. They used Term Finance’s own rules: propose the right changes, wait for no one to stop them, then let the protocol execute the rest. ❤️ Want to break down similar cases and trace on-chain fund flows yourself? Use BitOK Graph for your own investigations. Website | Telegram | BitOK bot 46·Aug 26

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